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1. Introduction 
 
 Many developed countries nowadays face low fertility rates, e.g., France (1.91), Germany 
(1.36), Italy (1.33), Britain (1.63) Sweden (1.75), and carry out various policies to improve 
childcare environment.1 Among these countries Japan’s rate is particularly low (1.29). Japan 
considers a low fertility rate to be a major obstacle for economic growth and subsidizes child 
rearing (the Parental Leave Act in 1992). However, an increase in the number of children 
generates costs as well as benefits. It not only increases total labor supply in the future, but also 
requires present child-rearing services. Thus, it decreases labor allocation for commodity 
production, which reduces per capita consumption if full employment is realized. In the 
presence of unemployment, however, the decrease in the individual labor supply shrinks the 
deflationary gap so that per capita consumption may increase.  
 This paper focuses on such a difference in the employment situation and examines the 
effects of a child-rearing subsidy, an improvement in the efficiency of child rearing (nursery 
schools, kindergartens, etc.) and a labor income tax on the fertility rate and per capita 
consumption. We find that the effects on individual consumption are opposite for the cases of 
full employment and unemployment, and hence the employment situation must be taken into 
account when considering a pro-population policy. 
 Becker and Lewis (1973), Razin and Ben-Zion (1975), Becker and Barro (1988), Palivos 
(1995) and Cai (2001) assume that the number of children affects utility and analyze the effects 
on fertility and consumption of child-rearing costs, public support for child rearing, 
productivity and preferences in a static and dynamic setting.2 Yip and Zhang (1996, 1997), 
Tamura (1996) and Tabata (2003) extend them to an endogenous growth framework and 
examine the impact of demographic transition on growth and welfare. Petrucci (2003) 
introduces endogenous fertility to a Sidrauski (1967) type monetary model and finds that the 
neutrality of money is invalid, i.e., monetary policy changes the fertility rate, labor supply, 
consumption and capital. However, all of the abovementioned studies ignore the possibility of 
                                                 
1 The fertility data are those of 2004 from OECD (2006). See Atoh and Akachi (2003) for an international 
comparison of family policies. 
2 Nerlove et al. (1987, ch. 5), Razin and Sadka (1995) and Nerlove and Raut (1997) provide useful surveys of 
various approaches to endogenous fertility. For empirical evidence in support of the endogeneity of fertility 
choice, see Wang et al. (1994). 
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unemployment. 3  To fill this void, we theoretically analyze the effects of pro-population 
policies in the presence of unemployment and compare them with those under full 
employment.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic structure 
of the model. The dynamics and steady state conditions are shown in section 3. Section 4 
focuses on the full-employment steady state and examines the effects of the abovementioned 
policies on per capita consumption. Section 5 considers the case where unemployment occurs 
in the steady state, which is presented by Ono (1994, 2001), and shows the effects of the 
policies are just opposite to those that arise under full employment. Finally, section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Model 
 
 We consider a competitive monetary economy populated by infinitely lived households. 
At each point in time, they determine consumption c, real money balances m, and the number 
of children n that satisfies 
  N& = nN,  
where N represents the population size. Each household’s lifetime utility is 
   U(c, n, m) = [ ] ,)exp()()()(
0
dttmvnfcu ρ−++∫ ∞  (1)  
where u(⋅), f(⋅) and v(⋅) satisfy the following properties:  
 u'(⋅) > 0, u"(⋅) < 0; f'(⋅) > 0, f"(⋅) < 0; v'(⋅) > 0, v"(⋅) ≤ 0.  
He (or she) allocates labor endowment, which is normalized to unity, to child rearing and labor 
market activities. Labor input γh(n) is required to bear and raise each child, where γ represents 
the inefficiency parameter of child rearing and h(n) is assumed to satisfy 
 h′(n) > 0, h″(n) > 0. 
The rest is the labor supply to the market: 
                                                 
3 An exception is Blau and Robins (1989). They empirically investigate the impact of child-care costs on 
fertility and employment using a household survey of employment opportunity pilot projects. 
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 [1 − γh(n)]N. (2) 
 The government imposes lump-sum tax z and wage income tax s, and gives child 
allowance τ to each household. Thus, each household’s flow and stock budget equations are 
 a& = ra + (1 − s)w[1 − γh(n)]x − c − Rm + τn − z,  (3) 
     a = m + b,  
where a represents real total assets, r and R the real and nominal interest rates respectively, w 
the real wage, x the employment ratio and b the real value of equities.4 Given labor demand L, 
x is represented by 
 x = min(1, 
Nnh
L
)](1[ γ− ).  
 Maximizing lifetime utility U given by (1) subject to (3) yields the first-order optimal 
conditions: 
 u'(c) = δ, 
 v'(m) = Rδ,       
 f′(n) = δ[(1 − s)wγh′(n)x − τ],     
 δ&  = (ρ −  r)δ,         (4) 
and the transversality condition: 
 limt→∞ δaexp(− ρt) = 0, 
where δ is the co-state variable of a.  
 From the conditions given by (4), we derive 
 ρ + σ
c
c&  + π = R = v′(m)/u′(c), (5) 
 xnhws
cu
nf )()1(
)(
)( ′γ−=′
′+τ ,                   (6)  
where    
 σ ≡ − u″(c)c/u′(c).  
                                                 
4 It is later shown that the firm value is zero because a constant-returns-to-scale technology is assumed.  
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We assume σ to satisfy5 
  σ ≥ 1.        (7) 
 The firm sector has a production function with constant returns to scale:  
 Y = θL,                           (8)  
where Y represents output and productivity θ is assumed to be constant. Given nominal 
commodity price P and nominal wage W, the firm sector determines labor demand L so as to 
maximize profits (Pθ − W)L. Under perfect adjustment of P it is always valid that 
 w = θ,                     (9)  
and thus profits are always zero, implying that the firm value is zero.  
 The government establishes such a social security system that the same level of wealth as 
held by an existing household is given to each newly born household. It imposes lump-sum tax 
z and wage income tax s to finance the initial setup wealth for newly born households and child 
allowances.6 Money stock Ms is assumed to expand proportionately to population size N so that 
the effect of monetary policy is neutralized, i.e.,  
 s
s
M
M& =
N
N& = n. (10) 
The government’s budget constraint is then 
 PzN + Psw[1 − γh(n)]xN = PτnN + AnN − sM& ,  
which reduces to  
 z + sw[1 − γh(n)]x = (τ + a)n − nMs/(PN).  
 Given such household, firm and government behavior as mentioned above, the money and 
equity markets perfectly adjust so that at any point in time7 
 the money market:  mN = Ms/P,  (11)  
                                                 
5 In fact, Hall (1988) and Guvenen (2006) empirically show 1/σ to be much smaller than 1. 
6 Developed countries tend to have a mature public redistribution system while developing countries tend to 
redistribute wealth to the next generation within each family. For simplicity, we assume that a complete public 
redistribution system is established so that each household does not privately care about the initial wealth of the 
next generation.  
7 Because of Walras’ law for stock variables, (12) is valid if (11) holds. 
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 the asset market:  bN = 0.    (12) 
The commodity market adjustment is also assumed to be perfect, and hence 
   c = θ[1 − γh(n)]x.  (13)  
In contrast, the nominal wage adjustment is sluggish so that we can treat the possibility of 
unemployment.8 It is simply represented by 
   
W
W&  = α(x − 1), (14)  
where α represents the adjustment speed of nominal wage W and x is given by (13). 
 
3. Dynamics and Steady State Conditions 
 
 From (6), (9) and (13), n is derived as a function of (c, τ, s, γ): 
 n = n(c; τ, s, γ)   ⇔  τ +  
)(
)(
cu
nf
′
′  = (1 − s)
)(1
)(
nh
nh
γ−
′γ c. (15)  
Using (7) and (15), we find that as long as τ and s are small enough, the partial derivatives of n, 
represented by nq for q = c, τ, s and γ, satisfy 
 nc = (σ − 1)f′(n)/[Φu′(c)c] > 0,    
 nτ = 1/Φ > 0,   
 ns = cγh′(n)/{Φ[1 − γh(n)]} > 0,    
 nγ = − ch′(n)/{Φ[1 − γh(n)]2} < 0,  (16) 
 where   .0
))(1(
))(())(1)((
)(
)(
2
2
>γ−
′γ+γ−′′γ+′
′′−≡Φ c
nh
nhnhnh
cu
nf  
 From (2) and (8), the production capacity per capita is 
                 yf(c; τ, s, θ, γ) = θ[1 − γh(n)], (17) 
where n is given by (15). From (16) and (17), in the neighborhood where τ = 0, 
                                                 
8 This assumption is imposed merely to allow disequilibrium to occur in the labor market; otherwise, the 
possibility of unemployment is intrinsically avoided. Note that under this assumption the possibility of a full 
employment steady state is not eliminated. In fact, section 4 obtains the full employment steady state under it.  
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 fcy = − θγh′(n)nc < 0,  fyτ = − θγh′(n)nτ < 0,   
 fsy = − θγh′(n)ns < 0,  fyθ = 1 − γh(n) > 0, 
 fyγ  = − θ[h(n) + γh′(n)nγ] 0)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)()(1
<
=
>
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
′
′′+′
′′−′′
′θ
Φ= nf
nf
nh
nh
nh
nh
cu
nfnh , (18) 
where fqy  represents ∂yf/∂q for q = c, τ, s, θ and γ. Note that fyγ  can be either positive or 
negative, depending on the functional forms of h(n) and f(n). For example, if 
 h(n) = nη  where  η > 1,     f(n) = en1−ν/(1 − ν)  where  e > 0, 
then 
 h′(n)/h(n) − h″(n)/h′(n) + f″(n)/f′(n) = (1 − ν)/n, 
i.e., fyγ  is either positive or negative depending on whether or not ν is smaller than 1.  
 Since (9) implies that P moves parallel to W, from (13), (14) and (17), the dynamics of P is 
 
P
P&≡π  = α(x − 1) =  α[c/yf(c; τ, s, θ, γ) − 1]. (19) 
By applying this equation into (5) we obtain the dynamics of c: 
 σ
c
c&  = v′(m)/u′(c) − ρ − α[c/yf(c; τ, s, θ, γ) − 1].         (20)  
From (10), (11) and (19), the dynamics of m is 
 
m
m&  = − α[c/yf(c; τ, s, θ, γ) − 1].              (21) 
Equations (20) and (21) form an autonomous dynamic system with respect to c and m. 
 In the steady state c stays constant and hence (20) yields 
                            v′(m)/u′(c) = ρ + α[c/yf(c; τ, s, θ, γ) − 1].        (22)  
Note that this property is valid whether or not full employment is realized. 
 
4. The Case of Full Employment 
 
 Under full employment x equals 1 and hence from (13), (17) and (22), 
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                 cf = yf(cf; τ, s, θ, γ) = θ[1 − γh(n)],   
 v′(m)/u′(cf) = ρ,            (23)  
where cf represents the per capita consumption under full employment. From the first equation 
of (23),  
 (1 − fcy )dcf = fyτ dτ + fsy ds + fyθ dθ + fyγ dγ. 
Since fcy < 0, as shown in (18), this equation gives 
 sgn dcf/di = sgn fiy      for  i = τ, s, θ, γ, (24) 
and thus from (18) we find  
 τ↑, s↑, θ↓ ⇒ cf↓,    
 γ↑ ⇒ cf↑   iff  0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)( >′
′′+′
′′−′
nf
nf
nh
nh
nh
nh . (25) 
 Since the total differentiation of the first equation in (23) gives 
 θγh′(n)dn = (cf/θ)dθ − θh(n)dγ − dcf, 
and (15) implies dcf to satisfy  
 dn = ncdcf + nτdτ + nsds + nγdγ, (26) 
dn satisfies 
 (1 + ncθγh′(n))dn = nc(cf/θ)dθ + (nγ − θh(n)nc)dγ + nτdτ + nsds. 
Therefore, from (16)  
 τ↑, s↑, θ↑, γ↓   ⇒   n↑.    (27) 
 The properties given by (25) and (27) are summarized as follows: 
 
PROPOSITION 1. If full employment is realized in the steady state, an increase in child allowance 
τ or income tax s increases the fertility rate and decreases per capita consumption. An increase 
in productivity θ increases both the fertility rate and per capita consumption. An increase in 
the efficiency of child rearing (viz. a decrease in γ) always increases the fertility rate, but the 
effect on per capita consumption is ambiguous. More precisely, 
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 dcf/dγ 
<
=
>
 0  iff  .0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
<
=
>
′
′′+′
′′−′
nf
nf
nh
nh
nh
nh  
 
 Intuitively, a rise in child allowance τ or wage tax s reduces the opportunity cost of child 
rearing, causing people to raise more children and reduce labor supply to the market. Thus, n 
increases and c declines. A change in γ has two opposite effects on cf. A decrease in γ (viz. an 
improvement in the efficiency of child rearing) directly increases labor supply and thus raises 
cf. However, it increases fertility rate n, causing labor supply to fall and thus cf to decrease. 
Therefore, the total effect of a change in γ is ambiguous.  
 
5. The Case of Stagnation under a Liquidity Trap 
 
 We next consider the case where a liquidity trap arises and unemployment persistently 
remains, as presented by Ono (1994, 2001), and compare the effects of the abovementioned 
policies and parameter changes with those in the case of full employment.  
 Money demand is given by the second equality of (5): 
 R = v′(m)/u′(c). 
Thus, a liquidity trap arises if the representative household has an insatiable desire to hold 
money: 
   limm →∞ v′(m) = β > 0,   
where β is an exogenous and positive constant.9 Figure 1 illustrates the money demand curve in 
this case.  
 In the presence of the liquidity trap the second equation of (23) may be invalid for any m. It 
is indeed the case if 
 ρ < β/u′(cf) (< v′(m)/u′(cf)  for any m),      (28)  
                                                 
9 See Ono (1994: 4-8) for discussions on the insatiable utility of money in the history of economic thought 
(e.g., Veblen, Marx, Simmel, Keynes) and its economic implications. The validity of this property is empirically 
supported by Ono (1994: 34-8) using the GMM (generalized method of moments), and more extensively by Ono, 
Ogawa and Yoshida (2004) using both parametric and non parametric methods. 
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i.e., the full-employment steady state does not exist. In this case a stagnation steady state is the 
only steady state, as proved by Ono (1994, 2001). Because of persistent unemployment P 
continues to decline and hence v'(m) converges to β. Thus, the steady state level of c that 
satisfies (22) is given by the intersection point of the following two curves: 
the l curve:    R = β/u′(c), 
the π curve:    R = ρ + α[c/yf(c; τ, s, θ, γ) − 1].  (29)  
Since u″(⋅) < 0 and fcy < 0 from the first property given in (18), both curves of (29) are 
increasing functions with respect to c, as illustrated in Figure 2. Intersection point E denotes 
the steady state in which c is smaller than cf, the full-employment level of consumption per 
capita. Since under (28) the l curve is located above the π curve, as shown by the Figure 2, in 
order for this c to exist, the following must be satisfied: 
 β/u′(cf) > ρ > α.      (30)  
As is also evident from Figure 2, under (30) the l curve is more inclined than the π curve at the 
intersection point, i.e.,10 
 Λ = −βu″(c)/[u′(c)]2 − α[1/yf(c; τ, s, θ, γ)  −  c fcy /(yf)2] > 0. (31) 
 From (29) we obtain 
 Λdc =  − [αc/(yf)2] fiy di     (for i = τ, s, θ, γ). (32) 
By comparing (32) with (24) we find 
 
LEMMA 1. If unemployment arises in the steady state, the effect of an increase in each (policy or 
technology) parameter (i.e., τ, s, θ, γ) on consumption per capita is just opposite to what 
obtains when full employment is realized in the steady state. 
 
 Figure 3 illustrates the effect of an increase in τ, an increase in s or a decrease in θ. From 
(18), each of them exogenously reduces yf and thus shifts the π curve upward toward the π′ 
curve, moving the intersection point of the two curves from E to E′. Consequently, per capita 
                                                 
10 In the appendix it is shown that (30) must hold for the present dynamics to be saddle-path stable. 
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consumption c increases from c1 to c2 while full-employment consumption per capita cf 
decreases from c1f to c2f. 
 From (19), at the intersection point given by (29)  
 β/u′(c) = ρ + α(x − 1), 
from which we obtain 
 {−βu″(c)/[u′(c)]2}dc = αdx. (33) 
Therefore, employment rate x moves in the same direction as c does.  
 Since (29) yields c as a function of τ, s, θ and γ, totally differentiating (15) leads to 
 dn = (ncdc/dτ + nτ)dτ + (ncdc/ds + ns)ds + (ncdc/dθ)dθ + (ncdc/dγ + nγ)dγ. (34) 
From (16), (18), (32) and (34), we obtain 
  dn/dτ > 0,  dn/ds > 0,  dn/dθ < 0. (35) 
The effect of an increase in γ on n is calculated in the appendix. It satisfies  
 dn/dγ < 0. (36) 
 Thus, from lemma 1, (33), (35) and (36), the following proposition obtains. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. If unemployment arises in the steady state, an increase in child allowance τ or 
income tax s raises the fertility rate, consumption per capita and the employment rate. An 
increase in productivity θ decreases the fertility rate, consumption per capita and the 
employment rate. An increase in the efficiency of child rearing (viz. a decrease in γ) always 
increases the fertility rate, but the effects on per capita consumption and the employment rate 
are ambiguous. More precisely, 
 dc/dγ 
<
=
>
 0  and  dx/dγ 
<
=
>
 0   iff   .0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
>
=
<
′
′′+′
′′−′
nf
nf
nh
nh
nh
nh  
 
 Intuitively, the child allowance policy urges people to have more children and thus 
decreases labor supply. In the presence of unemployment it reduces the deflationary gap, 
causing consumption to increase. Wage income tax s reduces net income from labor supply and 
hence decreases the opportunity cost of child rearing. It urges people to have more children and 
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decreases labor supply, which generates the same positive effect on per capita consumption as 
the child allowance policy does. An improvement in productivity θ widens the deflationary gap 
and increases deflation, which causes people to decrease consumption. It then reduces wage 
income and hence people decrease the number of children. 
 A decrease in γ (viz. an improvement in the efficiency of child rearing) increases the 
number of children, but the amount of labor that is required to rear each child decreases. 
Therefore, the effect on the labor allocation between child rearing and labor supply is 
ambiguous. It also implies that the effect on household consumption is ambiguous.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 Various policies that promote fertility increase total labor endowment, but reduce labor 
supply per capita because parents have to take care of children. Thus, if full employment is 
always realized, they reduce consumption per capita. For example, a rise in the child allowance 
or the wage tax reduces the opportunity cost of child rearing, causing people to have more 
children and lower labor supply to the market. Thus, consumption per capita decreases.  
 In the presence of unemployment, however, the decrease in the labor supply caused by a 
pro-population policy reduces the deflationary gap, lowers deflation and thus stimulates 
consumption per capita. The effects of such policies in the presence of unemployment are just 
opposite to those under full employment.  
 An improvement in the efficiency of child rearing (e.g., nursery schools and 
kindergartens) generates two opposite effects on consumption. It decreases the volume of labor 
required to rear each child and hence increases labor supply as long as the number of children is 
invariant. However, it increases the fertility rate, which requires parents to allocate more labor 
to take care of children and thus lowers labor supply to the labor market. Therefore, the labor 
supply per capita can either increase or decrease, depending on the shape of the utility function 
of having children and that of the cost function of child rearing. If it increases, consumption per 
capita increases as long as full employment is realized, whereas in the presence of 
unemployment it decreases, and vice versa. The effects of the policies that affect the fertility 
rate in the presence of unemployment are just opposite to those under full employment.  
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Appendix 
 
Derivation of equation (36) 
 From (17), (18), (32) and (34), 
 Λdn/dγ = ncαch(n)/[θ(1 − γh(n))2] + {Λ + ncαcγh′(n)/[θ(1 − γh(n))2]}nγ. (A1) 
From (17), fcy  in (18), and (29), Λ given by (31) satisfies  
 Λ + ncαcγh′(n)/[θ(1 − γh(n))2] = (ρ − α)σ/c + α(σ − 1)/[θ(1 − γh(n))]. (A2) 
Using (15) in which s = 0 and τ = 0, and nc and nγ given by (16), we obtain 
 nc = − nγ[1 − γh(n)](σ − 1)γ/c. (A3) 
Substituting (A2) and (A3) into (A1) and rearranging the result gives 
 Λdn/dγ = [α(σ − 1)/θ + (ρ − α)σ/c]nγ. 
Since σ ≥ 1 from (5), nγ < 0 from (16), ρ > α from (30), and Λ > 0 from (31), dn/dγ is negative, 
as described in (36). 
 
Dynamic stability 
 We examine the stability of the dynamics described by (20) and (21). For simplicity, we 
treat the case where child allowance τ and wage income tax s are both zero. Let k = 1/m, 
substituting (17) into (20) and (21) yields  
 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −α−ρ−′
′
σ= 1)()(
)/1(
cy
c
cu
kvcc f& , 
 k& = kπ = ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −α 1
)(cy
ck f . 
Linearizing them in the neighborhood of the steady state values (c*, k*) gives 
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
*
*
43
21
kk
cc
AA
AA
k
c
&
&
, (A4) 
where  
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 A1 (≡ ∂ c& /∂c) = ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −α−′
′′′−
σ ])/(/1[)]([
)/1()( 2
2
ff
c
f ycyy
cu
kvcuc , 
 A2 (≡ ∂ c& /∂k) = − ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
′
′′
σ 2)(
)/1(
kcu
kvc ,  
 A3 (≡ ∂ k& /∂c) = kα[1/yf − c fcy /(yf)2], 
 A4 (≡ ∂ k& /∂k) = π = α(c/yf − 1). 
Since the characteristic equation is  
 Ψ(λ) = λ2 − (A1 + A4)λ + (A1A4 − A2A3), 
eigenvalues λ1 and λ2 satisfy 
  λ1λ2 = A1A4 − A2A3 = ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −α−′
′′′−
σ ])/(/1[)]([
)/1()( 2
2
ff
c
f ycyy
cu
kvcuc π 
+ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
′
′′
σ kcu
kvc
)(
)/1( α[1/yf − c fcy /(yf)2]. (A5) 
 If full employment is reached in the steady state, π = 0 and hence the first term of (A5) 
becomes to zero. Since fcy  < 0 from (18) and v″(.) < 0, the second term is negative. Thus, λ1λ2 
< 0, implying that one of the eigenvalues is positive and the other is negative. Since c is 
jumpable and k (≡ 1/m) is non-jumpable, the dynamic path is saddle-point stable. 
  If there is no full-employment steady state and persistent stagnation arises, x < 1 and π < 0 
in the steady state. Therefore, k (≡ 1/m) approaches zero and the value given by the square 
brackets of the first term of (A5) equals Λ, which is positive from (31). Thus, the first term of 
(A5) is negative. The second term is negative since fcy  < 0 from (18) and v″(.) < 0. Therefore, 
(A5) is negative (λ1λ2 < 0), implying that the dynamic path is saddle-point stable.  
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Figure 2: Stagnation Steady State 
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